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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the denial of a Writ of
Habeas Corpus of the Third Judicial District In and For Salt
Lake County, the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., Judge,
presiding.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On the 12th day of January, 1976, an Order to
Show Cause as to why probation should not be terminated and a
committment to the Salt Lake County Jail was issued.

A

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by appellant and
was properly denied by the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr.,
District Judge.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek an affirmance of the lower court
denial of appellants Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and a
dismissal of the appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant pleaded guilty to the crime of petty
larceny in Salt Lake City Court on the 24th day of October, 1974.
On that date he was sentenced to imprisonment for six months and
ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $150.00. The imposition
of the jail sentence was stayed and appellant was placed on probation for one year.

On August 27, 1975, the court ordered a
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bench warrant to issue for the appellant based upon allegations
of probation violation.

On January 12, 1976, an Order to Show

Cause was issued as to why probation should not be terminated
and a committment issued.

A hearing was held on January 27,

1976, before the Honorable Robert C. Gibson, and it was determined
that petitioner had violated his probation and he was ordered
committed to the Salt Lake County Jail to serve the original
sentence of six months. A Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed and
the committment stayed until a final determination could be made
regarding the issue now before this Honorable Court.
POINT I
WHERE THERE IS NO STATUTORY AUTHORITY
DEFINING MAXIMUM PROBATIONARY PERIODS,
THE COURT IS PERMITTED TO EXERCISE
DISCRETION AND PROVIDE A PROBATION THAT
SERVES THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH IT WAS
CREATED - TO WIT, THE REFORMATION AND
REHABILITATION OF A DEFENDANT. THE TRIAL
COURT ACTED WELL WITHIN STATUTORILY PRESCRIBED DISCRETION IN PLACING PETITIONERAPPELLANT ON PROBATION FOR 1 (ONE) YEAR WHEN
THE MAXIMUM PERIOD OF INCARCERATION FOR THE
SAME OFFENSE WAS 6 (SIX) MONTHS.
The Utah State Legislature, in section 77-35-17, Utah
Code Annotated, (1953), as amended, has enacted a probation statute
that imposes no prescribed limitations of time for such probation
and has clearly left such matters to the discretion of the court
as seen below:
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77-35-17
Suspension of sentence - Probation-Conditions
of probation - Power of Court to dismiss or discharge defendant. Upon a plea of guilty or conviction of any crime or offense, if it appears
compatible with the public interest, the Court
having jurisdiction may suspend the imposition
for such period of time as the court shall determine.
The court may subsequently increase or decrease
the probation period, and may revoke or modify
any condition of probation. While on probation,
the defendant may be required to pay, in one or
several sums, any fine imposed at the time of
being placed on probation. The defendant may
also be required to make restitution or reparation to the aggrieved party or parties for
the actual damages or losses caused by the offense
to which the defendant has pleaded guilty or for
which conviction was had. Further the defendant
may be required to provide for the support of his
wife or others for whose support he may be legally
liable. Where it appears to the court from the
report of the probation agent in charge of the
defendant or otherwise, that the defendant had
complied with the conditions of such probation,
the court may if it be compatible with the public
interest whether upon motion of the County Attorney
or of its own motion, terminate the sentence or
set aside the plea of guilty or conviction of the
defendant, and dismiss the action and discharge
the defendant. Utah Code Annotated (1953), as
amended (Emphasis added)
Throughout the statute, the Utah Legislature has
provided the court with flexibility and discretion in the
administration of the probation provision.

The Court, by

statute, is not only permitted to set the duration of probation,
but also to modify any conditions of probation.
- 3-

A period of probation under Utah law should not
as a matter of law, be limited to the maximum jail sentence
that can be imposed.

Under Utah law, some jail sentences can-

not exceed 90 days, as for a Class C misdemeanor (Sec 76-3-204
(3)) and a probationary period of such limited duration hardly
serves any useful purpose.

It is in misdemeanor type offenses

where probation may be most appropriate rather than a jail
sentence.

But if the supervision of such a wrongdoer is to be

limited to the maximum jail sentence that can be served, probation in such cases becomes a meaningless gesture.

The

court in such cases, when given the alternative of a short jail
sentence or a short and thus, less meaningful probation period,
may well impose more jail sentences in subsequent cases. However, a supervised probation, if available, may well steer a
defendant away from further criminal activity and would certainly
decrease the defendant's chances of incarceration.
There is no clear delineation of case law in the
United States.

Nonetheless, the trend is decidely toward the

more enlightened utilization of probation beyond maximum
incarceration periods.

In 1970, the Maryland Legislature enacted

the following:
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"Upon entering a judgment of conviction, the
court having jurisdiction, may suspend the
imposition or execution of sentence and place
the defendant on probation upon such terms
and conditions as the courts deem proper.
The court may impose a sentence for a period
and provide that a lesser period be served
on confinement, suspend the remainder of the
sentence and grant probation for a period
longer than the sentence but not in excess of
five years.
Probation may be granted whether the offense
is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.
If the offense is punishable by both fine and
imprisonment, the court may impose a fine and
place the defendant on probation as to the
imprisonment. Probation may be limited to one
or more counts or indictments, but, in the
absence of express limitation shall extend to
the entire sentence and judgment. The court
may revoke or modify any condition of probation
or may reduce the period of probation.ff
Code, Art. 27, §641A, 1 July 1970 (emphasis added)
Probation is a program recognized in the law as
a means of rehabilitation and guidance for the public offender.
Recognizing this humane concept, most jurisdictions permit the
probationary period to exceed the maximum possible sentence if
the circumstances dictate and such to do so would be in the
interests of justice.

The legislature in Utah by enacting Utah

Code Annotated Section 77-35-17 has authorized the courts of
this state to increase the period of probation originally fixed
if it be in the public interest.
Defendants in many cases, through plea negotiation,
plead to a lesser included offense and frequently do such in the
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belief that a plea to the lesser offense may likely result
in consideration for probation.

If courts are limited to a

brief probation period, then judges are placed in the position
of either denying the plea to a lesser included offense or
utilizing jail sentences as the only reasonable sentence
remaining open.

Certainly, the public interest is better

served when a probation is ordered where there exists a
reasonable chance for rehabilitation than incarceration.
Federal statutes (18 USC §3651) provide for an
extended probation period and such as been supported by the
United States Supreme Court in a line of cases, the principle
of which is Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 23 L. Ed 2d
162, 89 S. Ct 1503 (1969).

(Citations of other cases are set

forth in 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law §1571 (4) Supplement)

In Frank,

Mr. Justice Thurgood Marshall expressed the interpretation of
the court of such statutes as follows:
"Numerous federal and state statutory schemes
allow significant periods to be imposed for
otherwise petty offenses. For example, under
federal law, most offenders may be placed on
probation for up to five years in lieu of or,
in certain cases in addition to a term of imprisonment.
Therefore, the maximum penalty authorized in
petty offense cases is not simply six months
imprisonment and a $500.00 fine. A petty
offender may be placed on probation for up to
five years and if the terms or probation are
violated, he may then be imprisoned for six
months,11 Frank, supra, at 167.
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The American Bar Association has set forth similar
guidelines in its Standards for Criminal Justice.
"1.1 Nature of sentence to probation.
(d) The court should specify at the time of
sentencing the length of any term during which
the defendant is to be supervised and during
which the court will retain power to revoke the
sentence for the violation of specified conditions.
Neither supervision nor the power to revoke should
be permitted to extend beyond a legislatively fixed time, which should in no event exceed two years,
for a misdemeanor or five years for a felony."
Standards, p. 21 Probation
The Committee's commentary adds the opinion that the
limits on the length of a sentence to probation should be determined independently of the appropriate length of a prison sentence
for the same offense and that a particular sentence to probation
should be meted in consideration of the individual needs of the
defendant.

Standards p. 26
The ABA Standards on Sentencing Alternatives and

Procedures further reflects on the current trend in purpose of
probation in stating that the basic objective of law and government
is to provide an orderly alternative to the adjustment of conflicts through self-help.

(It is noteworthy that the Utah Code is

cited as an example of non-institutional sentencing provisions.)
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"The second general principle, (regarding
robation) is that tne specific term thus
lxed should be statutory limitation not
be permitted to exceed five years in the
case of a felony or two in trie case of a
misdemeanor. The five year limit in felony
cases is found in many current statutes.
See e.g., Alaska Stat. §12.55.090 (c) (1962);
Ark. Stat. Ann. §43-2331 (1965 Supp); Colo.
Rev. Stat. Ann. §39-16-6 (1) (1963); Fla.
Stat. Ann. §775.14 (1965); Hawaii Rev. Laws
§258.53 (1965 Supp.); 111. Ann. Stat. c. 38,
§117-1(b) (Smith-Hurd 1964) (two year extension authorized); Kan. Gen Stat. Ann. §622243 (1964) (five year extensions authorized;
period cannot exceed authorized prison term) ;
La. Code Crim. Proc. §893 (1967); Neb. Rev.
Stat. §29-2219(1) (1964); N. E. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§504.1 (1955); N. J. Stat. Ann. §2A:168-1
(1953); N. M. Stat. Ann. §40A-29-17 (1964);
N. Y. Penal Law §65.00(3) (eff. Sept. 1, 1967);
Ore. Rev. Stat. §137.510(1) (b) (1963); 18. U.S.
C. 3651 (1964); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §7-315 (1957);
The five year limit is also recommended by the
Special Committee on Correctional Standards
appointed to assist the President's Criminal
Commission. See President's Comm'm Corrections,
Appendix A, p. 207.

P

"The limitation on the term for a misdemeanor is
not so common, although it is found in at least
four states and in the Model Penal Code, See Colo.
Rev. Stat. Ann. §39-16-6(1) (1963) (one year limit):
La. Code Crim. Proc. §894 (1967); Mich. Stat. Ann.
§28:1132 (1954); Neb. Rev. Stat. §29-2219(1) (1964);
Model Penal Code §301 2(1), Appendix B. infra. In
addition to the reasons which are applicable to
felonies, the limit for misdemeanor stems in part
from the position taken in section 2.6 infra, that
supposdedly ameliorative sentences should in general
not exceed the time limits placed on the prison term
authorized for the offense. Both this section and
section 216(b) contain limited exceptions to~this
eneral principle, authorizing two year sentences
or misdemeanors while expecting that the typical
jail term could not exceed one. In both cases, the
exception is warranted in order to permit a sufficient
length of time for rehabilitative programs to take hold.11
Standards p. 71 (Emphasis added)
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Another section of the Utah Code, §58-37-9 (10),
which deals with penalties for possessing marijuana, among
other things, provides that the court may place a defendant on
probation upon "any reasonable terms and conditions as may be
required.!f

It is apparent, therefore, that the legislature

intended to give the courts certain limited discretion in granting probation.

The legislature has thus provided all-importajit

flexibility in the administration of the humane perogative of
probation.

The court may set the duration of probation and

modify any conditions thereof.

This is consistant with the over-

all policy of the Utah Criminal Code as expressed in Utah Code
Annotated §76-1-104 (as amended 1975):
M

The provisions of this code shall be construed
in accordance with these general principles:...
(3) prescribe penalties...which permit recognition
of difference in rehabilitation possibilities
among individual offenders.11 (Emphasis added)
Courts in Colorado, like Utah, may grant probation for
whatever period as they deem best suited to the needs of the defendant and consistent with the interests of society. (C.R.S.
§16-11-202).

Other states allow the trial court to set probation

within some limit that has no relation to the possible incarceration
period.

In Nevada for example, probation may be extended for as

long as five years (NRS 176.215).

Hawaii, like Nevada places a

five year limit on probation, even for misdemeanors (HRS, §711-77).
Appellant cites Oklahoma as a state in which case law supports his
- 9-

position.

Note the date of Ex Parte Eaton, 29 Okla. Ct. App.

275, 233 P781 (1925).

Oklahoma in fact permits probation to

extend up to two years (OSA 22 §991c) and such became law in
1970 rendering Eaton impotent and without force.
Some states have different probation period
limitations depending on whether the defendant was convicted
of a felony or a misdemeanor.

Kansas specifies five years for

felonies and two years for misdemeanors.
Kansas as a supporting state.
137 P. 975 (1914).

Again, appellant cites

Note In re Carroll, 91 Kan. 395,

Carroll, however, is a 1914 case and has

long since been overturned by legislative action.

In Application

of Young, 201 Kan. 140, 439 P. 2d 142 (1968), the Supreme Court of
Kansas explains:
11

The parole authority of a police court was
considered in Carroll. The statute then in
effect (Laws of 1909, Chap. 116, Sec. 2) was
examined and since it provided no limit on the
term of a parole granted thereunder, this court
held that a police court had no power to grant
a parole for a term longer than the sentence
imposed. . .The statute was amended in 1947. .
under which a police court is specifically
authorized to grant a parole for a term extending beyond the sentence. . .
•k

*k

-k

The language of K.S.A. 20-2312 is plain and
unambiguous. . . .The statute supercedes any
case law pertaining to the subject. (43P P.2d
at 143, 145)
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Furthermore, felony probation in Kansas may be later extended
five additional years and misdemeanor probation may be extended
an additional two years.

The statute, however, goes on to pro-

vide that, in any case, felony probation can not be extended
past the sentence limit (KSA 21-4611).
true for misdemeanors.

Obviously, such is not

In Kansas, a misdemeanant may receive only

a year's incarceration (KSA 21-4502).

Therefore, in Kansas, a

misdemeanant may be placed on probation for up to four yearsthree years beyond the maximum possible incarceration!
Appellant relies heavily on Idaho cases in his argument,
particularly State v. Sandoval, 92 Idaho 853, 452 P.2d 350
(1969), and Ex Parte Medley, 73 Idaho 474, 253 P.2d 794 (1953).
Respondents contend that neither case applies to the case before
the court.

In Idaho, although probation can be four times longer

than imprisonment for a misdemeanor, the rule is different for
felonies where probation is limited by the maximum period of
incarceration.

Both the Sandoval and Medley decisions involve

felony convictions and not a misdemeanor conviction as in the
instant case, and therefore, neither case can be considered as
authority for appellant's position.
is similar to that in Kansas.

The Idaho statute in fact,

A misdemeanant may be place on

probation for up to two (2) years (IC 19-2601(7)), although the
maximum sentence is six (6) months imprisonment (IC 18-113).
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Again, note appellant's reliance upon the 1951f State v
Eikelberger case for support.
California extends probation well beyond most
jurisdictions.

In that state, a misdemeanant who could only

be incarcerated for ninety (90) days may be place on probation
for as long as three (3) years (California Penal Code, §1203a
and People v. Heath, 72 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1968)).
The state of Oregon directs that a defendant may not
be placed on probation for less than one year (ORS 137.010).
Among the fourteen (14) western states, only Arizona, New Mexico
and Washington restrict probation by the maximum length of
sentence (ARS 13-1657, NMSA 4 OA-29-19 and RCW 9.95.200).
There are many policy reasons for allowing a trial
judge the discretion to extend probation for a reasonable length
of time even if it may be for longer than the maximum possible
sentence.
Probation is an attempt to give first offenders and
some others a chance to demonstrate their capacity to overcome
their errors. Another reason for sustaining extended (but not
excessive) probation is to permit the trial judge the discretion
to extend probation beyond a six month period in order to permit
a defendant to meet other probationary conditions such as
restitution, reparation, or fine.
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To fail to permit such would

be tantamount to requiring incarceration without any humane
provision to consider individual circumstances.
Respondents strongly urge this court to affirm
the decision of the lower court.

Appellant would seek to

apply very rigid standards in an area that has a special need
for discretion,

A trial judge, at the time of sentencing and

with the information available to effectively analyze the
needs of the defendant and the best interests of society has
the greater overview to evaluate the needs of an individual
than has the legislature.

The legislature recognized this and

provided the statutory grounds to support the trial judge. The
legislature unequivocally endowed the trial court with broad
discretion which respondents ask this court to sustain.

Appellant's

authority for his position that probation should be limited by
statutory sentencing provisions demonstrates the minority view.
CONCLUSION
Thus, it may be seen that not only are the probation
requirements a function of the sound discretion of the trial court
but also, that the probation period may occasionally exceed the
statutory sentencing requirement of incarceration.

Support for

such a position is found by majority in recent case law and
represents the trend of the viewpoints of many jurisdictions
throughout the United States and without a legislative prohibitive
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to the contrary, such should be the position of Utah courts
in light of 77-35-17, Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended.
Respondents respectfully submits that the denial of appellants
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus should be affirmed and this
appeal denied.
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